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ensure allocative and technical efciency of scal
federalism. However, while the values of ( ) are 0.98 ,
0. 92 and 0.65 in Nigeria, Ethiopia and India meaning
that about 98%, 92% and 65% of the disturbance terms
(μ) are due to allocative and economic inefciencies
in scal federalism, in Brazil and South Africa only 0.041
and 0.23 representing 4% and 23% disturbance terms
are due to allocative and economic inefciencies in
scal federalism. This implies that while allocative and
technical inefciencies in scal federalism truncates
economic growth in Nigeria, Ethiopia and India, the
allocative and technical efciencies in scal
federalism promotes economic growth in Brazil and
South Africa. On this basis, the paper recommends
the need for most developing federal economies to
adopt Bottom – Top approach to scal federalism as
opposed to Top – Bottom approach. This will ensure
that sub national governments are coordinates not
subordinates to federal government revenues.
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INTRODUCTION

F

iscal federalism as a reform package for
improving technical, allocative and overall
economic efciency in delivering public goods
so as to stimulate economic growth has always been
a focus of attention in most developing federal
economies. This is because economic cum political
considerations suggest that policies aimed at
providing public goods that are sensitive to sub
national conditions are likely to be more technical
and allocative efcient in stimulating economic
growth than central provisions that disregard this
geographical differences ( Baskran, Lars & Jan, 2016).
Consequently, scal federalism which denes the
degree of scal autonomy and constitutionally
assigned responsibilities of the sub national
governments, has become an important discourse in
the policy arena of most developing federal
economies (Hateld & Kosee, 2013). This is because
the practice of centralized system of economic and
political administration in the context of ethnic
heterogeneity hinders the actualization of economic
potential and in the process limits efforts aimed at
achieving sustained economic growth (Asatryan &
Feld, 2015).
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Abstract
This paper investigated efciency gain argument of
scal federalism and economic growth with
evidence from ve selected developing federal
economies. The curiosity is to ascertain whether the
efciency gain –the fundamental argument why
countries adopt scal federalism is justied in these
economies. The paper uses stochastic frontier model
to achieve this objective. The evidence from the
selected developing federal economies revealed
diverging results. While in Nigeria, Ethiopia and India
there is more expenditure decentralization than
revenue decentralization suggesting that efciency
gains from scal federalism may remain elusive, in
Brazil and South Africa there is more revenue
decentralization than expenditure decentralization
suggesting evidence of efciency gains from scal
federalism. The major reason why efciency gains
from scal federalism is elusive in Nigeria, Ethiopia and
India is because of top – bottom approach to scal
federalism orchestrated by the delay that money and
services witness before reaching the local
beneciaries. Naturally, the gamma parameter
( )that measures the percentage of the disturbance
term due to inefciency is expected to be low to

Similarly, from 1980s to date, there has been a
resurgence of interest in economic growth of most
developing federal economies (Ibih, Ajaude &
Nkamare, 2016). An outstanding element in the policy
mix given to the developing federal economies to
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stimulate economic growth is the need to restructure
the public sector nances so as to make it more
efcient in promoting economic growth.

structured into ve sections as follows:- Section two
reviews theoretical and empirical literature. Section
three presents data sources, methodology and
model specication. Section four discusses empirical
results, while section ve concludes the paper with
conclusion and recommendations.

It has been observed that despite several decades of
scal federalism experience, extant studies have
established a downward trend in economic growth of
most developing federal economies in the last three
or four decades. (African Development Indicators,
2016).
For instance, the two biggest economies in
Sub Sahara African -Nigeria and South Africa entered
into technical recession in 2016 as their Gross
Domestic Products (GDP) declined by 3.16 and 0.70
percent respectively (World Bank Development
Indicators, 2016). This has made researchers like
Baskran, Lars and Jan (2016), Appah (2010), Alade
(2003) to describe economic growth performance of
most developing federal economies as of prolonged
lackluster performance and of crisis proportion.

2.0

Literature Review

2.1

Theoretical Literature

Decentralization Theorem, constitutes the
fundamental building blocks of what may be referred
to as the rst generation theory of scal
decentralization (Oates, 2006; Bird, 2009). The theory
focuses on situations where different levels of
government provide efcient levels of outputs of
public goods. That is those goods whose special
patterns of benets are encompassed by the
geographical scope of their jurisdictions (Oates,
2006).

In spite of these dire situations with potential dangers
for sustained economic growth, much have not been
done to actually underscore how efcient is scal
federalism in bringing about sustained economic
growth in developing federal economies. Much of
the extant studies on scal federalism in developing
federal economies have been explicitly or implicitly
disposed towards studying the theory and dimension
of scal federalism ( Dare, 2011, Lukpat,2013) or
explaining the pattern of intergovernmental scal
relations (Jose,2003, Jason, 2006, Igwebuike &
Emengini,2010) or providing an inexplicit view within
the context of political economy of probable
consequences of such relationship ( Odukwe, 2016,
Ugwu, Eme & Emeh, 2012). A notable exception in the
extant studies is the work of Owolabi (2011), Ojide and
Ogbodo (2014) and Baskran, Lars & Jan (2016) that
investigated the impact of scal federalism on
economic growth.

According to the theory, each levels of government is
seen as seeking to maximize the social welfare of the
citizens within its jurisdiction (Bird, 2009). This multilevels quest becomes very important where public
goods exists, the consumption of which is not national
in character, but localized (Qates, 1972). In such
circumstances, local outputs targeted at local
demands by respective local jurisdictions clearly
provide higher social welfare than central provision (
Qates, 1972).
The theory also recognized that, given the multiplicity
of local goods with varying geographical patterns of
consumption, there was hardly any level of
government that could produce a perfecting
mapping for all public goods (Qates, 2006). This is
because sub national governments are better in
adapting output of public goods to a particular
preferences and circumstances of their
constituencies as compared to the federal
government provisions that assumes that one size ts
all. Thus, it is recognized that there would be local
public goods with inter-jurisdictional spill-overs
(Musgrave, 1959). That is public goods whose benets
are enjoyed beyond the local jurisdiction. In that
situation, the local authority may then under-provide
for such a good (Musgrave, 1997). To avoid this, the
theory requires the central government to provide
matching grants to the lower level government so
that it can internalize the full benets (Samuelson,
1954).

However, the fundamental argument (efciency
gain argument) why countries adopt scal federalism
and how such measures inuences economic growth
is conspicuously missing in the existing studies. Further,
the paucity of systematic comparative evidence as
the focus of the established studies is mainly on
specic country analysis makes it difcult to have a
broader and generalized view of the evidence of
efciency gain in scal federalism. It is in a bid to ll this
gap and add to the body of knowledge in the eld of
scal federalism, that, this paper investigates
efciency gain of scal federalism and economic
growth: Evidence from selected developing federal
economies. To achieve this objective, this paper is
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Based on the theory, the role of government in
maximizing social welfare through public goods
provision is assigned to the lower tiers of government (
Qates, 2006). The other two roles of income
distribution and stabilization are regarded as suitable
for the central government. Based on the total
agreement among the proponents of this theory, we
can summarize the role assignment which ows from
the theory thus: the central government is expected
to ensure equitable distribution of income, maintain
macroeconomic stability and provide public goods
that are national in character. Sub national
governments on the other hand are expected to
concentrate on the provision of local public goods
with the central government providing targeted
transfers in cases where there are jurisdictional spillovers associated with local public goods.

positive relationship between decentralization and
economic growth. This is because to the authors,
better targeting of growth-enhancing infrastructure
investment under federalism could raise country's
growth rate.
However, ndings from extant studies like (Baskaran &
Feld, 2013, Gemmell & Sanz, 2013) were mixed. This is
because their ndings revealed that spending
measure of scal federalism decreases economic
growth while revenue measure increases growth. This
arises due to the choice of empirical measure
adopted by different researchers. Although, the main
objective of scal federalism is to ensure efciency
gain in public good delivery, however, this fact is not
sufciently recognized in the existing literature.

Following from the assignment of functions, taxes that
matched more effectively the assigned functions are
also assigned to the relevant level of government.
Benets taxes are also prescribed for sub national
governments based on the conclusion that such
taxes promote economic efciency when dealing
with economic units. The nal element of this basic
theory is the need for scal equalization. This is in the
form of transfers from the central government to
decentralized governments where there are spill-over
effects.
2.2.

3.0

Data Sources, Methodology and Model
Specication

3.1

Analytical Framework

The economic rationale for scal federalism is the
need to promote efciency in the use of a nation's
resources. Thus the role of different tiers of
governments in efcient delivery of public goods
under the partnership arrangement called scal
federalism is usually the focus of attention. Therefore,
the analytical framework underpinning this study is
the Barro(1990) two – sector production function
framework. This production function assumes that an
economy is made of two sectors called the public
sector (G) and the Private sector (P) whose output
depends on two inputs of Labour (L) and Capital (K).
The production function takes the form of
Y = f (L, KP, KG)----------------------------------------------------(1)
Where Y = Output, L = Labour, KP = Private capital per
labour, KG = Public Capital per labour. The function
also assumes that the public sector (G) has some
inuence on the output of the Private sector (P).
Given this scenario, the sectoral production function
becomes:
YP =f P (LP, KP, G)------------------------------------------------(2)
YG = fG (LG, KG)-------------------------------------------------(3)
Combining equation (4.2) and (4.3) yields
Y = fP(LP, KP, G) + fG(LG, KG) --------------------------------(4)
It also assumed from equation (4.4) without generality
loss that public sector (G) is made up of three tiers of
government called the Federal, the State and the
Local governments and by extension that public
spending imbedded in the function is carried out by
these three tiers of governments. Therefore, taking K
as private capital stock, G as total government (F
=federal government spending, S as state

Empirical Literature

Extant empirical literatures show a link between
federalism, efciency gain and economic
performance. For instance, (Ogbonna & Osadume
,2017, Anit, 2014, Gemmell & Sanz, 2013, Baskaran &
Feld,2013, Rodriquez –Pose & Ezcurra,2011, Eric,2009)
Wibbles,2006), Abu,2005, Rodden and Wibbles ,2001,
Treisman,2000, Bruecker,1999, Anyanwu,1999,
Davoodi & Zou,1998, Grossman and West ,1994, ,
Egwaikhide, 1994, Ariyo,1993, Oyejide,1972), stress
that increased scal federalism has negative effect
on growth. To them collective action of problems and
variance of interests that affect federalism jeopardize
implementing macroeconomic policies and
economic adjustment policies that are seen as public
goods which have serious negative implication on
growth.
On the contrary, studies by (Ibi, Ajaude & Nkamare,
2016, Ojide & Ogbodo, 2014, Federico & Elliott, 2012,
Antonis, Manthos & Pantelis, 2008, Jason, 2006,
Stansel, 2005, Iimi, 2005, Akai & Sakata, 2002,Lin & Liu,
2000, Yilmaz, 1999, Kletzer & Singh,1996), found a
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government spending and L as local government
spending), all measured on per capita basis, the
production function becomes

----------------------------------------------------------------------(11)
Equation (4.11) is a function of share of revenue and
spending by the sub national governments. However,
the existing studies like ( Baskaran, Lars & Jan, 2016)
have it that given the share of total government
spending in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a
reallocation of public spending to sub national
governments can bring about higher economic
growth if the existing allocation is not a growth –
maximizing expenditure share. To underscore this, by
maximizing equation (4.9) subject to equation (4.10)
as constrain gives the growth – maximizing sub
national government spending share thus:

Where Y = Economic growth, L = Labour, K = Private
capital stock, G =( federal, state and local
Governments),
= Error term and
and
are parameter estimates, where
Flowing from equation (4.5), the study assumes that
the size of government (G) impacts on economic
growth and that scal federalism that reduces the size
of central government promote efciency by
matching preference to needs.
Therefore,
theoretically, it is anticipated that scal federalism
fosters economic growth via technical, allocative
and economic efciency in public goods delivery.
However, empirical evidence on the direction of
impact is mixed and controversial. A strand of extant
literature showed that increased scal federalism
reduces economic growth ( Baskaran & Feld, 2013,
Rodriques –Pose & Ezcura, 2011,). Other strand of
empirical studies revealed a positive impact
(Sansel,2005, Gil – Serrate & Lopez –Laborda,2006, Ibi,
Ajaude & Nkamare,2016). In addition, some existing
studies revealed mixed results (Gemmell & Sanz, 2013,
Bodman, 2011). This showed that the impact of scal
federalism on economic growth is an empirical issue.
Also, intergovernmental scal relations or scal
federalism is expected to inuence the output of
government (G). Therefore, introducing scal
federalism (FDC) as an explanatory variable in the
model gives
YG = f(FDC)--------------------------------------------------------(7)
Therefore incorporating the three measure of scal
federalism in equation (7) into equation (5) gives
----------------(8)

----------------------------------------------------------------------(12)
In equation (4.12), the numerator is the share of the
sub national governments' spending and the
denominator is the consolidated or total (federal,
state and local governments) spending. Hence as
far as the sub national governments' shares are
different from growth – maximizing share, the growth
rate will always increase without changing the total
budget's share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
3.2.

Model Specication

The study adopted stochastic frontier model
developed by Farrell (1957).
This was found
appropriate for two reasons:- rst, the model assumed
that the disturbance term has two components
called the statistical noise or error term and the
inefciency component. Therefore, the greater the
amount by which the realized economic growth (Y)
falls short of this stochastic frontier, the greater the
level of inefciency gains from scal federalism.
Secondly, the model captures the effect of
exogenous shock due to measurement error. That is to
say, the model accounts for unbiased identication in
the midst of confounding variables. An appropriate
stochastic frontier formulation is:
--------------------------------(13)
Where Y = Economic growth (GDP), Xi = Input, Vi =
random variables assumed to be normally distributed,
= random variables that account for the
inefciency. Given this scenario, the reformulated
stochastic frontier model for this study becomes:-

Where
= the proportion of sub national
governments revenue to total government revenue
(Revenue measure (FDCI),
the proportion of sub national governments
revenue to total government spending (Simultaneity
measure ( FDC3).
Where
= 1----------------------------(9)
and
for
and
However, total government spending (g) is nanced
through government revenue (R ). So that,
G = RY -------------------------------------------------------------(10)
Combing equations (4.9) and (4.10), the solution for
efciency gain from scal federalism can be stated
thus:

---------------------------------------------------------------------- (14)
Where In = Natural Logarithm, Yt = Economic growth
proxied by RGDP, X1 = Labour input, X2 , X3 and X4 =
Three measures of scal federalism ( FDC1, FDC2 and
FDC3),
= Constant,
and
= Parameters to
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be estimated,
= random variable assumed to
independently and normally distributed with zero
mean and constant variance N
------------ (15)
= Non- negative random variable that accounts
for inefciency in economic growth – scal federalism
nexus. It is also assumed to be normally distributed
with N
------------------------------------------------ (16)
It is expected that the gamma parameter (
) that
measures the percentage of disturbance term due to
inefciency be low to ensure allocative and technical
efciencies of scal federalism that will promote
economic growth.
3.3

2016. The variables used in this study include revenue
measure (FDC1) dened as sub national
governments 'own revenue as a ratio of total
government revenue. This reects the
decentralization of taxing power. Expenditure
measure (FDC2) dened as sub national
governments' spending as a ratio of total government
expenditure. It reects the decentralization of the
spending power and Simultaneity measure (FDC3)
dened as Sub national expenditure as a ratio of total
federal revenue. Data for these variables are sourced
from the apex bank statistical bulletins of the
respective countries. Other variables include, Real
Gross Domestic Product (RGDP), sourced from World
Bank development indicators.

Data sources and denitions of Variables

This section presents the selected federal countries for
the study and the rationale for their selection, the
data set used and the denition of the variables on
which the data are sourced. The selection of ve (5)
countries is based on the fact that their institutional
frame work of their scal federalism followed a
complex political, social, economic and ethnic
pluralism and that they are among the most scally
decentralized countries as measured by the degree
of government expenditures at the sub national
levels. The study examined the period from 1980 to

4.0

Discussion of Empirical Results

This section of the paper presents results of the
estimation using stochastic frontier model for the
selected economies of Nigeria, Brazil, India, Ethiopia
and South Africa. However, it is important to rst of all
present the summary statistics of the variables used in
the estimation to both ascertain their behavior and
underscore the appropriateness of technique
employed in the paper. The result of the summary
statistics is presented on table 1 below.

Table 1 Summary Statistics of the Variables used in the Model

Source: Authors' computation based on the data of each selected countries

From table 1, the mean values of all the measures of
scal federalism, the proportion of sub national
governments revenue to total government revenue
(FDC1), the proportion of sub national governments'
spending to total government spending(FDC2) and
the proportion of sub national governments revenue
to total government spending(FDC3) are positive. It is
worth noting that out of the three measures of scal
federalism,(FDC1) and (FDC3) account more for scal
autonomy of the sub national governments than
(FDC2). This is because; it is not possible to have scal
autonomy without scal equivalence. To this end
while FDC1 is having the highest value in Brazil, FDC2 is
having the highest value in Nigeria, South Africa, India
and Ethiopia. This implies that while there is revenue

decentralization in Brazil, there are revenue
centralization in Nigeria, South Africa, India and
Ethiopia.
Also, the minimum and maximum values range from
positive to positive in all cases for all the variables. The
implication is that all the variables are increasing
overtime. However, FDC1 overtime increases more
than FDC2 in Brazil while FDC2 over time increasing
more than FDC1 in other four selected economies.
This implies that while the sub national governments
revenue rises more than their expenditure in Brazil, in
other four selected economies, the sub national
governments expenditure rises more than their
revenue. The skewness which measures the
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asymmetry of the distribution of the series around the mean are positive. Although, the skewness of the normal
distribution is zero, all the variables are positively skewed and greater than zero.
Jaque-Bera statistics showed that the null hypothesis that all variables are normally distributed cannot be
accepted as all the variables are statistically insignicant at 5%. Therefore all the variables used in the study are
not normally distributed. This implies that Ordinary Least Square estimator becomes inappropriate, thereby
justifying our choice of stochastic frontier model.
Table2: Comparative Empirical Evidence of Efciency Gains from Fiscal Federalism in Brazil,
Nigeria, Ethiopia, India and South Africa.

Source: Author's computation based on the results, where δμ = inefciency component,
= gamma
parameter, X2 = chi square, LR = Likelihood Ratio, TR= Time Ratio and Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results of Table 2 on the efciency gains from
scal federalism provide not only an interesting
insight on how scal federalism is practiced in
developing federal economies but revealed widely
deviating results. As stated in the summary statistics,
of all the three measures of scal federalism,
Revenue measure ( that is the proportion of sub
national governments revenue to total government
revenue (FDC1) and Simultaneity measure (that is the
proportion of sub national governments revenue to
total government spending (FDC3) account more
for scal autonomy of the sub national governments
and consequently on efciency gain than the
Expenditure measure that measures the proportion
of sub national governments' spending to total
government spending. This is because scal
autonomy is not achievable without scal
equivalence. However, the evidence from the

selected developing federal economies revealed
diverging results. This is so as the gamma parameters
( ) that measure the percentage of the disturbance
term due to inefciency is 0. 98 , 0. 92 and 0.65 in
Nigeria, Ethiopia and India respectively meaning that
about 98%, 92% and 65% of the disturbance terms (μ)
are due to allocative and economic inefciencies in
scal federalism in these economies. Also, the
examination of the likelihood ratio test result using chi
square (X2) distribution conrmed the presence of
allocative inefciencies. Furthermore, the linear trend
coefcients are negative and insignicant at
conventional 5% level. The implication of these
ndings is that in Nigeria, Ethiopia and India efciency
gains from scal federalism remains elusive. The major
reason why efciency gains from scal federalism is
elusive in Nigeria, Ethiopia and India is because of
vertical scal imbalance resulting from top – bottom
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On the other hand, in Brazil and South Africa, the
revenue measures are highly signicant at 1%. This is
so because, in Brazil the sub national governments
control one of the major revenue yielding items in
constitution (Value Added Tax (VAT) while in South
Africa scal imbalance at the sub national levels are
bridged by the transfer equivalent that accounts for
the bulk of the sub national governments' revenue.

approach to scal federalism orchestrated by the
delay in the time that money and services take to
reach the local beneciaries.
Naturally, efciency gain is guaranteed if most of the
public goods and services are produced and
delivered at the level closer to the beneciaries.
However, this is only achievable where there is sub
national governments' scal equivalence.

Therefore, the scal federalism experience of Brazil
and South Africa validates the mainstream
theoretical insight behind scal federalism that sub
national governments allocate resources better
than the central government which usually results in
technical, allocative and economic efciency.
Finally the general implication of this result is that
although theoretical justications for scal
federalism may be the same, its practicability and
associated efciency gain differ in federal systems
based on institutional framework.

On the other hand, in Brazil and South Africa only
0.041 and 0.23 representing 4% and 23% disturbance
terms are due to allocative and economic
inefciencies in scal federalism. Also, the results of
the likelihood ratio test results using chi square (X2)
distribution conrmed the presence of allocative
efciencies in these economies. Also, the linear trend
coefcients are positive and signicant at
conventional 5% levels. The implication of this nding
is that there is evidence of efciency gains from scal
federalism in Brazil and South Africa.

5.0
To underscore this, while in India, the two revenue
measures (FDC1 and FDC3) are insignicant at 1%, 5%
and 10% respectively. in Nigeria and Ethiopia The
case is even worse in Nigeria and Ethiopia as FDC3 is
insignicant with FDC1 appearing negative and
signicant. This is surprising in the light of the
conventional expectation that sub national
governments' revenue to total government revenue
is usually associated with positive economic growth
that culminates into high efciency gains. The result
suggests that scal federalism in Nigeria, India and
Ethiopia does not yield a clear pattern of scal
decentralization on the revenue side.
The
implication of this, is that the principle of scal
equivalence is highly compromised thereby
preventing the sub national governments from
efciently delivering on their constitutionally assigned
responsibilities that will bring about technical,
allocative and economic efciency.

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the ndings, it can be concluded that lack of
scal equivalence orchestrated allocative and
technical inefciencies of scal federalism is the
major cause of truncated economic growth in some
of the selected federal economies. On that note,
this paper recommends the need for most
developing federal economies to adopt Bottom –
Top approach to scal federalism as opposed to Top
– Bottom approach. This will ensure that sub national
governments are coordinates not subordinates to
federal government revenues. It is also
recommended that there is need to chart a new
direction in scal development among the
developing scal countries by encouraging front
loading (more revenue drive) as against back
loading (expenditure drive).

This ndings, suggest that the dominance of the
federal government in these three federal
economies contradicts the scal federalism theorem
that local outputs targeted at local demands by
respective local jurisdictions clearly provide higher
social welfare and efciency than central provision
that believe in one cap t all syndrome.
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